Published by Cambridge University Press, 1996, softcover, index, 146 pages, condition: new.
In this highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognized authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skillfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The book is not technical and requires no special background knowledge. As such, it could be enjoyed by students and professionals in a wide range of disciplines: political science, philosophy, decision theory, economics and biology.
The book is deceptively short and covers a lot of material in a bit more than hundren pages. The material is perfectly accessible and requires no prior knowledge although familiarity with (evolutionary) game theory would be helpful. Actually, the book is all about games and explains how the notion of fairness might have evolved, why altruism is reasonable, where meaning and language come from, how regularities in interactions affect the outcome, etc. If you liked Chapter 5 on language you might want to read Skyrms' other book on signalling.