They Live By The Sword: 32 'Buffalo' Battalion-South Africa's Foreign Legion

Published by Lemur, 1990, hardcover, index, 272 pages, illustrated, no dust-jacket otherwise condition: very good.

Breytenbach's method was a simple one - he instilled in his men a total commitment and loyalty to the unit, rather than to a country or cause, the time-tested formula of the French Foreign  Legion. He also demanded total loyalty to the black troops from his white officers - a vital factor if the unit were to become an efficient fighting force.32 Battalion first saw action as "Combat Group Bravo" during Operation Savannah in 1975, after Breytenbach had fed, clothed and trained what he called "the most miserable, underfed, ragged and villainous bunch of troops I had ever seen in my life..." Breytenbach knocked his new recruits into shape, often literally by using his fists, gaining their respect and willing cooperation.The account of Operation Savannah which takes up several chapters of the first part of the book provides an insider's viewpoint of the campaign that was the start of South Africa's involvement in Angola.Much of the equipment used by the Battalion during Op Savannah was obtained in classic guerrilla fashion - by "liberating" it from other units. At one stage 14 newly arrived Unimogs mysteriously went AWOL from the army maintenance unit and by the time the MPs were notified were already in action with 32 Battalion in Angola.Breytenbach's methods of warfare were as unconventional as his methods of obtaining equipment for his unit. When he was denied permission to demolish a bridge across the Okavango, which he knew was being used by FAPLA, he sent a Recce team to demolish it anyway and then sent a signal to Task Force HQ that he had heard unaccounted for explosions in the area and asked innocently should he investigate? He then later signalled that reconnaissance had revealed that the bridge had been destroyed, according to locals, by UNITA...

Lacking heavy weapons and equipment, 32 Battalion had to adopt guerrilla tactics and prove themselves better at this style of warfare than their enemies, FAPLA and SWAPO. They fought on foot, harassing the enemy in their own home base areas, using the vital element of surprise to keep them off balance. Tracking was easy in the sandy soil of Angola, but made anti-tracking extremely difficult, so that the level of expertise needed was high if they were to remain out of sight and reach of the enemy. The black troops, with their guerrilla background, possessed the required skills already, but their white leaders had to learn new skills on the job, coping with severe extremes of temperature and lack of food and water for long periods. Black and white had to rely totally on each other and developed close relationships, so close that when on one occasion a white lieutenant was killed, his men carried his body for several days, all the while engaged in a running battle with SWAPO, refusing to abandon him to the enemy or the bush.Initially Breytenbach was not very impressed by his allies, UNITA, and there were a number of clashes between them and his men, formerly rivals in the war against the Portuguese. One such clash involved an accidental engagement in which 13 French mercenaries and 70 UNITA soldiers in a Panhard armoured car, 5 heavily-armed land-rovers and some Unimogs armed with Entac missiles, 106mm anti-tank guns and SAM-7s were captured by a mere handful of Breytenbach's Recces:

The French wandered about disconsolately, in spite of having put away a bottle or two of wine with Willy and his men while toasting the international comradery of paratroopers. They, quite correctly, felt they had badly lost face in their game of wits with the South Africans. All wore the green berets and badges of French Foreign Legion paratroopers, which meant they considered themselves the most formidable fighters in the world, and certainly a cut above the South African Recces, whom they had not even heard of..The increasing effectiveness of 32 Battalion in the years following Operation Savannah led to the usual tactic of atrocity allegations from overseas armchair warriors and "experts" A white deserter, Edwards, fled to Great Britain and claimed in the press that 32 Battalion troops had been slaughtering civilians and committing atrocities in Angola, alleging it was official policy to eliminate SWAPO supporters. The overseas media, as usual, lapped up every word. From time to time similar allegations were made against the unit, and all of them including Edwards', were investigated by highly qualified independents from outside the ranks of the armed forces, and found to be without substance.